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Separation as a Ground for Divorce in Virginia
CHARLES

P.

BEEMUS

THIRD YEAR LAW STUDENT

Jurisdiction to grant divorce in all of the states is purely
statutory and the grounds are only those set out in the
statutes. Accordingly, no matter how unhappy a married
couple is, or how great their desire to end the marriage,
unless a statutory ground exists, there can be no relief in
the form of divorce. Virginia now has nine statutory grounds
for an absolute divorce from the bond of matrimony. Va.
Code Ann. Sec. 20-91. (1960 Replacement Vol.)
The general notion running throughout the divorce law of
the various states is the equitable doctrine of "clean hands".
Only the innocent spouse or the party injured may obtain a
divorce decree from the wrongdoer. Generally, if the petitioning party is independently guilty of misconduct constituting
ground for a divorce, that party may not obtain a divorce.
Thus, the doctrine of recrimination has become a widely
used ground of defense and probably the most criticized.
In 1891, Chancellor Kent, speaking of this doctrine in his
commentaries on marriage, remarked that "it is throwing
the parties back upon society, in the undefined and dangerous
character of a wife without a husband, and a husband without
a wife, "2 Kent's Commentaries, 64.
Slowly, state legislatures are realizing that divorce should
no longer be regarded as a punishment for the guilty party
and that emphasis should be shifted to divorce as a remedy
for family troubles, providing for the granting of divorces
in cases where normal marital relations are virtually impossible.
At present, the one major statutory ground for divorce
not clearly based on notions of guilt and punishment is that
of separation of the parties for a period of time.
In 1960 the General Assembly of Virginia amended Sec.
330
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20-91 of the Virginia Code, adding a ninth ground for divorce
from the bonds of matrimony. It provides that divorce may be
decreed "on the application of either party if and when
the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without
any cohabitation and without interruption for three years."
In 1962 the legislature deleted a requirement that both parties
should have been domiciled in Virginia at the time of separation, and removed a limitation which precluded service of
process by publication in such a case. It added this provision:
"A plea of res adjudcataor of recrimination with respect to
any other provision of this section shall not be a bar to either
party obtaining a divorce on this ground."
The question now presents itself-what limitations, if any,
will be read into our statute, and how will it be construed
and interpreted by our Supreme Court of Appeals? In an
attempt to predict the answer to these questions, inquiry has
been made into Virginia's past decisions on divorce to determine whether the state policy tends to be liberal or strict
in various phases of divorce law. Also, cases have been collected from other jurisdictions which have the same or similar
statutes. Of course, when estimating their value as authority
in Virginia, the decisions must always be considered with
reference to the particular statute construed.
To date there are nineteen states which make "living
separate and apart" a statutory ground for divorce. Ala.
Code tit. 34, See. 22; Ariz. Code Ann. See. 27-802(9); Ark.
Stat. Ann Sec. 34-1202(7); Idaho Code Ann, Sec. 32-610; Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 403.020(1) (b); La. Rev. Stat. Sec.
9:301; Md. Ann Code art. 16, Sec. 33; Minn. State. Ann. Sec.
518.06(8); Nev. Comp. Laws Sec. 9467.06; N. C. Gen. Stat.
Sec. 50-5(4),-6; N. D. Rev. Code Sec. 14-0605; R. I. Gen Laws
c.416, See. 3; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann, art. 4629 (4) ; Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 30-3-1(8) ; Vt. Rev. Stat. Sec. 3205(7) ; Wyo. Comp.
Stat. Ann. See. 3-5906; D. C. Code Ann. Sec. 16-403; P. R.
Laws. Ann. tit. 31, Sec. 321(9); Wash. Rev. Code Sec. 26.08.020(9); Wis. Stat. Sec. 247.07(7).
In Arkansas, Maryland and Wisconsin, and the District of
Columbia, the statutes expressly require that the living apart
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be voluntary. In Vermont and Wyoming the complainant must
be without fault. But most of the statutes do not use the
terms "voluntary" or "fault" and provide broadly that the
divorce may be granted to either party.
The state of Washington expressly provides that divorce
will be granted without regard to fault. In Arkansas, fault
is relevant only as to property division or alimony. Maryland,
North Dakota, and Vermont expressly require that there be
no reasonable likelihood of reconciliation. Several other state
statutes say divorce will be granted at the court's discretion.
The period of separation should be sufficiently long to indicate little or no chance of reconciliation and yet not so long
as to encourage the formation of meretricious relationships.
The statutes require anywhere from an upper limit of ten
years in Rhode Island to only a two-year separation in North
Carolina and Louisiana.
The principal legal questions that probably will be raised
by our Virginia living separate and apart statute are as
follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

What constitutes such separation?
To what extent must the living apart be voluntary,
and what constitutes voluntary living apart?
The effect of a spouse's insanity during the separation period.
Under what circumstances will alimony be awarded?
What Constitutes SeparationP

What constitutes such separation? The majority view holds
that living under the same roof, even though there has been
a severance of sexual intercourse and other marital relations,
precludes a finding that the parties have lived separate and
apart, 166 A.L.R. 508.
The Alabama court expressed the majority view by stating
" 'separate and apart,' means we think, not only a complete
cessation of all martial duties and relations, but that the husband and wife lived separate and apart in such a manner that
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those in the neighborhood may see that they are not living
together," Rogers v. Rogers, 258 Ala. 477, 63 So. 2d 807
(1953). See -also York v. York, 280 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky. 1955).
In contrast to this strict view, that there must be a complete
physical separation, is rthe case of Hawkins v. Hawkins, 191
F. 2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1951), which has essentially the same
facts. The United States Court of Appeals granted a divorce
under the District of Columbia separation statute which allows an absolute divorce for a "voluntary separation" for
five years without cohabitation. It appeared that for some
twenty years the parties had no marital relations, occupied
separate bedrooms, and had no sort of social life together.
The whole family occasionally ate together, but the husband
and wife did not speak to each other on these occasions. In
allowing the divorce, the court quoted Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F.
2d 229 (D. C. Cir. 1946). "The essential thing is not separate
roofs but separate lives."
How will Virginia hold on the question of whether a complete physical separation is necessary7 The phrase in our
statute which reads "separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption" seems to clearly indicate a legislative intent of a complete physical separation,
or that the parties must live under separate roofs. It would
seem that the courts must assign to that phrase the meaning
which its reading spontaneously suggests.
There is a second issue which falls under the question of
separation and merits consideration. The cases suggest a
split of authority on just what type and degree of conduct by
the parties will prevent the statutory period from running.
In Reilly v. Reilly, 57 R.I. 432, 190 A. 476 (1937), the couple
engaged in marital relations on only three occasions during
the ten-year separation period-twice at the home of the
wife's relatives where she lived and once on a steamer going
to New York. The court in not permitting a divorce rejected
the appellant's contention that these engagements should only
be construed as unsuccessful ,attempts at reconciliation and
not cause a break in the separation period. The court said the
language of the statute was clear and unambiguous-that not
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only must the parties live apart from one another, but all
ordinary marital relations must cease entirely.
The opposite view is presented in Ayala v. Ayala, 182 La.
508, 162 So. 59 (1945). Here the evidence showed that the
husband visited his wife at her home on various occasions
to plead with her to be lenient with him because of his inability
to pay alimony. In a suit by the husband, the wife argued that
cohabitation had occurred on these visits, but that in any
event the living separate and apart as contemplated by the
statute was not continuous. The court affirmed the granting
of a divorce saying that it believed that it was to the best
interests of society and the parties concerned that estranged
spouses be encouraged to continue their friendly relations
and thereby increase the probability of a reconciliation.
Virginia's statute reads "separate and apart, without cohabitation and without interruption." (Emphasis added.)
None of the other state statutes uses the phrase "without
interruption". When the Virginia bill to amend Sec. 20-91
was originally presented, it did not contain this phrase. The
phrase "without interruption" also appears in the Virginia
statute, Va. Code Ann. Sec. 20-121 (1950), merging a bed and
board decree into an absolute divorce, in describing the one
year period of separation. There are few Virginia cases
which indicate just what the interpretation of "without interruption" should be in regard to our merger statute. In Avderson v Anderson, 196 Va. 26, 82 S.E. 2d 562 (1954), the Virginia court said that frequent week-end visitations between
husband and wife during the legal separation period showed
failure to comply with the requirement that the separation
must have been continuous without interruption. Certainly,
when the phrase "without interruption" was added in drafting the final enactment of the separation statute, it was added
for a purpose. It is suggested then, that the Virginia courts
will follow the strict view, and hold that there will be a tolling
of the statutory period upon one instance of a resumption
of any of the marital relations.
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Must Separation Be V'oluntary?
To what extent must the living apart be voluntary? In Otis
v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146, 166 A.L.R. 494 (1946).
while the husband was away from home in the Navy, the wife
left the home; at the time of suit less than two years had
elapsed since she left but more than two years had elapsed
since the husband went away. It was held that the required
time (two years) had not elapsed. The court said:
"The separation means more than mere living apart.
Business and other necessities may require the husband
to live in one place and the wife in another. The separation intended by the statute is a separation by which
the marital association is severed. It means the living
asunder of the husband and wife. It is a voluntary act,
and the separation must be with the intent of the married persons to live apart because of their mutual purpose to do so, or because one of the parties with or
without the acquiescence of the other intends to discontinue the marital relationship. It certainly was not
the intention of the lawmaker that the statute should
apply to cases where the separation of the spouses was
involuntary as in the case of a husband inducted in the
military service. If, however, while the husband is serving in the service, his wife absents herself from the
matrimonial domicile with the intent to discontinue all
the marital privileges and responsibilities and continues
her absence for the statutory periol, it must be presumed
that her act is a voluntary act."
This opinion expresses the view of most states whose statutes do not expressly state that the separation must be "voluntary". According to the majority, it is sufficient if the separation is voluntary as to only one of the spouses, and it need
not be by the consent of both parties, (see also Harp v. Harp,
43 Wash. 2d 821, 264 P. 2d 276 (1953).
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The minority view adopts the notion that when "voluntary"
is expressly stated or when the courts read into the statute
that the separation be voluntary, it must be such as to both
spouses. In short, there must be a separation by mutual agreement, Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414 (1938).
(The court held a separation is not voluntary if a wife leaves
her husband because of his cruelty.) Beck v. Beck, 180 Md.
321, 24 A. 2d 295 (1942). (Voluntary connotes an "agreement" and the statute is not applicable in favor of a wife
where the husband has left her.)
All the states adhering to this minority view, with the
exception of Maryland, Nichols v. Nichols, 181 Md. 392,
30 A. 2d 446 (1943), (the fact that the wife had previously
sought divorce on the ground of desertion, was enough to
convince the court that the separation was not voluntary),
presume that a prolonged separation is voluntary as to both
parties, and that the burden of proving its involuntary nature
rests with the defendant, Buford v. Buford, 156 F. 2d 567
(D. C. Cir. 1946) ; Sanders v. Sanders, 135 Wis. 613, 116 N.W.
176. Thus, this limited application of the requirement is in
accord with the real purpose of the separation statutes. Yet
in these jurisdictions a definite, expressed attempt at reconciliation by the defendant during the period of separation
renders the separation involuntary, Butler v. Butler, 154 F.
2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 16 A. 2d
924 (1940).
The North Carolina statute reads: "Marriage may be dissolved and the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of
matrimony on the application of either party, if and when the
husband and wife have lived separate and apart for two
years," N. C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 50-5(4)-6 (1950). It will be noted
that the term "voluntary" does not appear. Yet the court
takes the view that in order to satisfy the statutory requirement of separation there must be present at least an element
of mutuality, Young v. Young, 225 N. C. 340, 34 S.E. 2d 154
(1945). The court said there can be no voluntary separation
sufficient to form a basis for divorce without the conscious
act of both parties, and there must be an agreement express
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or implied. North Carolina seems to be the only state among
the minority whose statutes do not expressly contain the word
"voluntary" to hold this view. But there is an indication that
North Carolina may be departing from it.
In Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N. C. 654, 68 S.D. 2d 247 (1951),
the court remanded for new trial a case in which the facts
were not clear as to whether the husband left home because
of the necessity of his job or with the intent to sever the
marital bond. The court in a dictum said there must be at
least an intention on the part of one of the parties to cease
cohabitation.
Will the Virginia courts require mutuality for a divorce
under our new statute? One of the main purposes behind
separation, statutes is to grant a divorce when there appears
to be little chance of reconciliation. To require mutuality of
intent would only be limiting this purpose. When the Virginia
bill to -amend See. 20-91 of the Virginia Code was presented,
it contained the word "voluntary" in describing living separate and apart. On final passage of the bill the word "voluntary" was struck out. Thus, it seems that our legislature was
aware that mutuality of intent to sever the marriage relationship has been implied whenever the word "voluntary" was
used in a state statute. It is suggested they did not desire
this; hence, the word was deleted.
Effect of 1%sanity
What will be the effect of insanity of a spouse during the
three year period? In the majority jurisdictions which allow
a divorce on the ground of separation if it was voluntary as
to one spouse but involuntary as to the other or against the
latter's wishes, one might logically assume that if a sane
spouse leaves the other there is a statutory separation regardless of whether the other is or later becomes insane. Most
jurisdictions so hold, 111 A.L.R. 873; 19 A.L.R. 2d 162. However, some of the majority jurisdictions recede from this
position in insanity cases and hold that the separation has to
be voluntary as to both spouses, Serio v. Serio, 201 Ark. 11,
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143 S.W. 2d 1097; Anno. 19 A.L.R. 2d 166, (1940). Camire v.
Camire, 43 R. I. 489, 113 Ati. 748 (1923). And, of course. in
law, an insane spouse does not have the capacity to intend to
sever the marital bond.
What will be Virginia's position concerning insanity arising during the statutory period of separation? First, it is
interesting to note that out of the nineteen states with separation statutes, only five do not have incurable insanity as
a ground -for divorce. Of these five, four states (Arizona excepted, since Arizona's separation statute expressly states
that the living apart may be for any reason, Ariz. Code Ann.
See. 27-802(9)-Texas, Rhode Island. Louisiana. and Arkansas-follow the minority view, not allowing their separation
statute to apply whenever there is insanity of either spouse
during all or part of the separation period.
In the case of Serio v. Serio, supra, the husband attempted
to obtain a divorce after his wife had been committed to an
insane asylum during part of the three year statutory period.
Even though the Arkansas statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec.
34-1202(7), expressly provides that such a separation may be
by the voluntary act of only one party, the court refused the
divorce, stating that to hold otherwise was tantamount to
holding that insanity continuing for the period of three
years was a ground for divorce, and insanity was no longer
a ground for divorce in Arkansas.
In Camire v. Camire, supra, the Rhode Island court denied
the divorce upon essentially the same facts. Answering the
contention of the petitioner that the statutory provision is
without qualification and that a voluntary act by only one
party was all that was necessary, the court pointed out that
it could be said that the statutory provision making extreme
cruelty and adultery grounds for divorce are equally unqualified, yet the proof of acts of extreme cruelty and adultery
by an insane spouse do not constitute a cause for divorce in
favor of the petitioning spouse.
These decisions no doubt illustrate a strong feeling in these
states that it is against public and moral policy to allow
divorce whenever insanity is involved. Virginia, also, will
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not admit even the most incurable insanity, if occuring after
marriage, as a ground for divorce. To many this is a shocking
result-but nevertheless it remains unchanged. At first blush,
it would appear that Virginia would probably follow the
minority and not permit the statue to apply whenever a
spouse is insane during all or part of the separation period.
But before a prediction is made, the desertion side of the
picture as a ground for divorce in Virginia should be examined. The great weight of American authority holds that
if, in a desertion case, the deserting spouse was sane when
he deserted the plaintiff, but before the expiration of the
statutory period he became insane, the insanity precludes
the granting of a divorce, Anno. 19 A.L.R. 2d 167-on the
reasoning that the deserting party could not maintain a raiional intention to desert for the full statutory period. But
by statute in Virginia it is expressly stated that it shall be
no defense that the guilty or -abandoning party had been
adjudged insane during the one year period necessary for
desertion,'Va. Code Ann. Sec. 20-93. Virginia by this statute
is indirectly permitting insanity as a ground for divorce.
Because of these two conflicting approaches that Virginia
has taken on the issue of insanity, it would seem to be a
matter of pure conjecture how Virginia will hold concerning
the voluntary nature of our separation statute when insanity
is involved.
Recrimination
The majority of states with separation statutes permit
either party to maintain the action, irrespective of who was
at fault, Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 278 P. 2d 200 (Idaho, 1954) ; Finnegan v. Fivnegan, 285 P. 2d 488 (Idaho, 1955); York v. York,
280 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky., 1955) ; Richards v. Garth,223 La. 117, 65
So. 2d 109 (1953); Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F. 2d 509
(D. C. Cir. 1944); 23 Texas L. Rev. 194. Prior to 1962 only
two of these states, Washington and Alabama, had statutes
expressly providing that divorce should be granted without
regard to fault, Wash. Rev. Code See. 26.08.020(9); Ala. Code
tit. 34, See. 22.
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In 1957, the question of recrimination arose for the first
time under Maryland's statute which allows an absolute
divorce on the ground that the parties had voluntarily lived
separate and apart, without cohabitation, for three years,
Md. Ann. Code art. 16, See. 33. In the case of Matysek v.
Matysek, the husband, defendant, set up recrimination, based
on the wife's adultery, as a defense, 212 Md. 44, 128 A. 2d
627 (1957). The Maryland Court of Appeals granted the wife
a divorce stating "the statute authorizing a granting of
divorces in cases of voluntary separation established a nonculpatory ground for divorce and thus introduced a new
social policy into our law of divorce. The Legislature by this
statute manifested an intention to permit the marriage relationship to be terminated in law, as well as in fact, without
regard to fault."
The court would not read into the statute a limitation which
was not there expressed and which seemed inconsistent with
its general purpose.
The one theme which seems to run throughout all the
majority decisions is based on the proposition that when a
husband and wife have lived apart for a long period of time,
with no intention of resuming conjugal relations, the best
interests of society and of the parties themselves will be
promoted by a dissolution of the marital bond.
As has been seen, this question has been put to rest in
Virginia by the 1962 amendment to Code section 20-91 expressly providing that recrimination "shall not be a bar to
either party obtaining a divorce on this ground."
Probabilityof Reconciliation
The Virginia separation statute as originally proposed
ended with the phrase "and such separation is beyond any
reasonable expectation of reconciliation." This phrase was
deleted when the statute was put in its final form. A similar
phrase now appears in Virginia's "merger" statute. (This
statute states that a bed and board decree may be merged into
an absolute divorce, if the court should be of the opinion that
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no reconciliation has taken place or is probable.) Under the
"merger" statute, the courts have placed the burden of proof
on the applicant to show that "there is no probable expectation of a reconcilation." Not only is this burden of proof at
times difficult to sustain, but this phrase leaves a certain
amount of discretion to the court as to whether the final
decree shall be issued. In deleting this phrase from our separation statute, it is suggested that the legislature intended
that the three year separation in itself was proof enough of
impossible reconciliation and that possibly it did not intend
that the courts should be given even the limited amount of
discretion which the phrase implies. For instance, a conservative court, endowed with this discretion, could restrict many
divorces which might normally be allowed under our separation statute.
Alimony
When should alimony be awarded? Although the fault of
the parties is not generally considered under most separation
statutes, the courts properly and often do consider the element of fault when determining the question of alimony and
adjudicating the property rights involved. Only the Arkansas
statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 34-1202(7), expressly states
that fault is relevant only to property division or alimony.
There have been numerous cases in which the plaintiff
husband has obtained the divorce decree, but the wife has
proved her innocence and has been awarded alimony. Larsen
v. Larsen, 207 Ark. 543, 181 S.W. 2d 683 (1944); Lloveras v.
Reichert, 197 La. 49, 200 So. 817 (1941); Sandlin v. Sandlin,
289 Ky. 290, 158 S.W. 2d 635 (1942).
Conclusion
Another advantage of our separation statute is that it will,
to a degree, preserve the alienability of property. In cases
where the wife refuses to obtain a divorce in an effort to tie
up her spouse's realty, a public service would result in re-
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quiring her vengeance, her concern for children, or other intentions, to take, after the lapse of three years, the form of
alimony under a divorce, and not a dower interest used as if
it were a sword.
Generally, Virginia's divorce laws have been strict, only
allowing divorces in the more serious cases. To get around
these harsh results it is suspected that much fraud has been
worked on the courts. Many mutual separation suits go uncontested and fraudulent testimony to get the required corroboration necessary for divorce is probably prevalent. Of
the small number of divorces that are contested, perhaps the
real reason is not to re-establish the home, but personal
vengeance and personal gain. Our present statute should
eliminate a great deal of this.
Virginia has shown definite signs of liberalizing its divorce
laws in certain areas, some of which already have been mentioned. Another great step has been taken with the enactment
of our 1960 separation statute. With its 1962 amendment the
statute clearly indicates that divorce is available to either
party without reference to fault. It appears to be mandatory
in terms and few restrictions can or will be read into it without frustrating the obvious purpose of the legislature.

